9月12日，经士智库组织国际权威专家围绕“新疆种族屠杀”这一人权议题录制“经士视点（Global Governance Perspective）”播客（Podcast）节目，并于9月14日在经士智库境外社交媒体账号播出。这是经士智库“经士视点”播客的第一期节目，首期节目主持人为经士智库创始人、总裁田士臣海军上校（退役），对话嘉宾为著名国际人权法教授、灭绝种族与死刑问题专家威廉·沙巴斯教授。本期播客田士臣与沙巴斯讨论的主要内容包括：

1）灭绝种族罪的设立背景与目的。

2）国际法中规定的灭绝种族罪的主客观要件及其历史演变。

3）美国国务院有关报告、NewlinesInstitute、澳大利亚战略政策研究所以及德国学者郑国恩都对新疆存在灭绝种族罪提出了指控，针对这些指控有哪些分歧以及这些指控为何立不住脚。

4）上述报告和个人文章的可信度，尤其它们是否可以为国际法院与国际刑事法庭所采信。

5）在并非“Tu Quoque”的辩论逻辑下，一些西方国家也存在明显的严重的人权问题，如美国“黑命贵”、今年5月浮出水面的大量加拿大寄宿学校无名儿童墓以及澳大利亚军队在阿富汗所犯下的战争罪等，这些西方国家的人权犯罪为何没人追责或无法追责。

6）英国律师罗德尼·迪克森向国际刑事法院提出有关“中国从塔吉克斯坦强行驱逐维吾尔族”的所谓新证据，由于塔吉克斯坦是罗马国际刑事法院规约缔约国，国际刑事法院能否参考国际法院罗兴亚案的逻辑，以犯罪行为发生地在塔吉克斯坦为由行使管辖权。

身为加拿大籍的沙巴斯教授在英国密德萨斯大学、荷兰莱顿大学、爱尔兰国立高威大学等多所学校任教，是国际学术界公认的国际刑法和国际人权法权威专家，他出版了专著《国际法上的灭绝种族罪：犯罪中的犯罪》。沙巴斯教授同时还是执业律师，在国际法院冈比亚诉缅甸罗兴亚案、克罗地亚诉塞尔维亚《灭种公约》适用案的法律团队中担任辩护律师。

录音剪辑江琳；翻译莫祖明；文字编辑吴丹洋：

Global Governance Perspective

Podcast Episode 1: A Conversation with Professor William Schabas on Genocide in International Law

（Transcript in full text）

“经士视点”播客第一期

与威廉·沙巴斯教授对话国际法上的种族屠杀问题

Andy TIAN: Welcome to the global governance perspective, a podcast presented by the global governance institution where we pool together international expertise to contribute to global governance. I'm retired Captain Andy TIAN, the Founder and President of the Global Governance Institution. This is our very first episode. Given the rising number of allegations of genocide in recent years, for instance, in Sudan, Burma, Iraq, China, and as well as the sharply different opinions either for or against those allegations, it is more than timely to kick off this debut episode on Genocide in international law. What are the international benchmarks for constituting the crime of genocide in international law? Why are there sharply different views in its application? To answer those questions and concerns, today, we are very glad to welcome Professor William Schabas, who teaches public international law at the Middlesex University of U.K., the Leiden University of Netherlands and the National University of Ireland Galway. Professor William Schabas is the author of a number of books on public international law, including a very authoritative monograph entitled “Genocide in International Law: the Crime of Crimes”. In this book, he gave a comprehensive analysis of the history and application of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. He's one of the best experts in this area to share perspective with us. So let me first invite Professor William Schabas to say hello to audiences both in China and around the world. Professor William Schabas,

欢迎来到《经士视点》，一个由经士智库推出的播客节目，经士智库旨在汇集国际专业知识，致力于为全球治理做出贡献。我是退役海军上校田士臣，经士智库的创始人和总裁。这是我们的第一期节目。鉴于近年来对灭绝种族的指控越来越多，例如在苏丹、缅甸、伊拉克和中国，以及对这些指控的，支持或反对的，更尖锐的不同意见，现在开启关于国际法上的灭绝种族罪的讨论作为第一期播客播出恰逢其时。国际法上构成灭绝种族罪的国际基准是什么？为什么他们的适用会出现尖锐的不同的观点？为了回答这些问题和关切，今天，我们非常高兴地欢迎威廉·沙巴斯教授，他在英国米德尔塞克斯大学、荷兰莱顿大学和爱尔兰戈高威国立大学教授国际公法。威廉·沙巴斯教授是多本国际公法著作的作者，其中包括一部非常权威的专著，题为《国际法上的灭绝种族:罪中之罪》。在这本书中，他全面分析了《联合国防止及惩治灭绝种族罪公约》的历史和适用。他是这个领域最好的专家之一，可以和我们分享他的观点。首先，让我邀请威廉·沙巴斯教授向来自中国及世界各地的观众们问好。威廉·沙巴斯教授有请。

William Schabas: Yes, very nice to see you, Andy. I'm very happy to be with you for the…for this podcast and to speak a little bit about some of the legal aspects of the crime of genocide from the perspective of international law. I think as you know, this is a term that is used in a variety of circumstances. It has a precise legal definition, but it is frequently used in other contexts. And this has created a lot of confusion where allegations are made of genocide that are not really consistent with the international legal definition.

好的，很高兴见到你安迪。我很高兴能和大家一起参加这个播客，并从国际法的角度讲一点关于灭绝种族罪的法律问题。如你所知，灭绝种族是一个在各种情况下都会用到的术语。虽然它有着一个精确的法律定义，但在其他场合也经常被使用。这使得许多对于灭绝种族的指控出现了混淆，其并非真的符合国际法上的定义。

Andy TIAN: Thank you professor for joining us. Let me start with the historic origin of this crime. What is the background and purpose when establishing the crime of genocide after World War II?

感谢教授来到本期播客，让我先从灭绝种族罪的历史渊源说起。二战之后确立灭绝种族罪的背景和目的是什么？

William Schabas: The word “Genocide” was invented in 1944 as World War II was coming to an end. There were a number of attempts to try and describe and define new crimes at the international level, in order to deal principally with the atrocities committed by the Nazi Germany…the government of Nazi Germany. And one of them was the notion of genocide. For the great trial that took place at Nuremberg of the International Military Tribunal, the term “Crimes against humanity” instead of “Genocide” was actually used in the Charter of the Tribunal, and by the judges. And a very similar definition was used by the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, what we call the Tokyo Tribunal. The definition of “Genocide” was developed in some ways in reaction to the definition of “Crimes against humanity” at Nuremberg out of a sense that the definition of “Crimes against humanity” as it was used at Nuremberg was inadequate, was incomplete. And the reason was that it didn't deal with atrocities committed in peacetime. We can say the same about the Tokyo Tribunal. It was less significant in a way of the issue of crimes against humanity because the Japanese didn't commit atrocities against their own citizens, against their own people, which was not the case, of course, with the Germans. So the notion of “Crimes against humanity” emerged, or rather of “Genocide”. The definition of “Genocide” is an international crime emerged late in 1946, following the Nuremberg Trial, and it emerged in order to deal with severe atrocities committed during peacetime against national, ethnic, racial and religious groups. And it was addressed and discussed in a General Assembly Resolution, a resolution of the General Assembly, adopted in December of 1946, but only defined in a definitive sense and the definitive legal sense by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the 1948 convention. So the definition of “Genocide” adopted in 1948, is, in one sense, broader than the definition of “Crimes against humanity” used at Nuremberg, because it deals with atrocities committed in peacetime. But it's much narrower in another sense because unlike crimes against humanity, it only deals with certain groups. And moreover, and this is really the most important facet of it: it only deals with the destruction of the group. And that has been understood since then, in interpretation by important courts and tribunals, including the temporary tribunal set up by the United Nations for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as by the International Court of Justice, the world court, in two important decisions as requiring the intent to destroy the group in a physical sense that is to exterminate the group, physically. And so this is where…this is really the heart of the debate because in many of the recent cases, where the term “Genocide” has been used, there is very weak evidence…or no real serious evidence to demonstrate an intent to destroy the group physically.

“灭绝种族”一词是在1944年被创造出来的，当时第二次世界大战即将结束，人们在国际层面上对新的罪行的描述与界定做了许多尝试，主要是为了处理纳粹德国政府犯下的暴行。其中之一就是灭绝种族的概念。在纽伦堡国际军事法庭进行的大审判的法庭宪章里，实际上被法官们使用的是“危害人类罪”一词而不是“灭绝种族罪”。远东国际军事法庭，也就是我们所称的东京法庭，也使用了非常相似的定义。“灭绝种族罪”的定义在某种程度上是对纽伦堡审判中使用的“危害人类罪”定义的回应，因为纽伦堡审判中使用的“危害人类罪”定义是不充分的、不完整的,理由是它没有涵盖和平时期犯下的暴行，这一点对于东京法庭来说亦是如此。在反人类罪的问题上，这一点不太重要，因为日本人没有对自己的公民和人民犯下暴行。当然，德国人并非如此。因此出现了“危害人类罪”的概念，或者更确切地说是“灭绝种族罪”。“灭绝种族罪”的定义是1946年末纽伦堡审判后出现的一种国际罪行，它的出现是为了处理和平时期对国民、民族、种族和宗教团体犯下的严重暴行。1946年12月通过的一项联合国大会决议讨论了这一问题，但联合国大会在1948年的公约中只是从确定的意义和确定的法律意义上对其进行了界定。因此，1948年通过的“灭绝种族”定义在某种意义上比纽伦堡审判中所使用的“危害人类罪”定义更广泛，因为它涉及和平时期犯下的暴行。但从另一方面上来说，它又要窄得多，因为与反人类罪不同，它只涉及某些群体。此外，其中最重要的一点是:它只处理针对群体的消灭。此后，这一点得到了理解。包括前南斯拉夫问题国际刑事法庭和卢旺达问题国际刑事法庭在内的主要法院和法庭以及国际法院——世界法院，在两项重要裁决中解释说，要求具备在实质意义上消灭该群体的意图，即从物理上根除该群体的存在。所以这才是争论的核心，因为在近期的许多案件中，在使用“灭绝种族”一词时，证据都非常薄弱，或者没有真正严肃的证据来证明从物理上消灭该团体的意图。

Andy TIAN: Thank you, William, for the historical background and its evolution. Now there have been many debates over the crime of genocide, like the conference on Xinjiang held in early September in Newcastle University. Apparently, the existence of the different views relates to the understanding of the concept of the crime of genocide in international law. So, using the legal term to explain it, according to the Genocide Convention, what are the material and mental elements of the crime of genocide? Have the elements of this crime changed anyway so far since it was established in the convention? Thank you.

感谢威廉教授为我们讲述灭绝种族罪的历史背景及其演变。现在有很多关于灭绝种族罪的争论，比如9月初于纽卡斯尔大学举行的关于新疆问题的会议。显然，不同观点的存在关系到对国际法中灭绝种族罪概念的理解。所以，用法律术语来解释，根据《联合国防止及惩治灭绝种族罪公约》，构成灭绝种族罪的主观（心理）和客观（实质）要件是什么？自《公约》确立以来，这一罪行的构成要件有没有发生变化？谢谢你。

William Schabas: Like all legal texts, of course, there is often a great deal of space for interpretation. And some of the people…there have been various interpretations proposed of the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention. I think that to be fair, there are also many people, activists, some academics, who have their own definition of genocide, who were dissatisfied with the definition of genocide in the convention. And they use it, they advanced other approaches and other definitions using the word, but clearly, and often admitting that these are not covered by the, by the definition, the legal definition. So what I'm going to…I'm not going to address that. That's outside the sphere of international law. Within international law, we're dealing with the definition, which is essentially in Article 2 of the 1948 Genocide Convention. And that definition has been repeated over and over again, confirming that it is very much the established international legal definition of genocide. So, we find word for word, the same definition in Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in the statutes of the International Criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, and so on. Now, that definition speaks about destruction, but it doesn't speak of physical destruction. Nevertheless, as interpreted by the major international courts, there's a requirement of physical destruction. I don't think there's any doubt about this in terms of the applicable international law. I recently participated in a webinar where there was another international lawyer who was saying: Well, no, it's open to debate whether physical destruction is required. But I think that's quite wrong. I don't think, I mean, you can say that anything is open to debate, but when you have judgments of the major international tribunals that are essentially unanimous on this point, one cannot claim that this is a question that is open for discussion anymore. It’s simply ignorant to suggest that. So the physical elements are, there are two pieces, two parts to the physical elements. There's a list of physical acts of genocide that begins with killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. And then it goes on to talk about preventing births and so on. As a general rule, these physical acts of genocide are not very difficult to prove. In all of the allegations of genocide, there is some basis for claiming one of those five acts has been committed. When we have the second act, which is causing mental harm to members of the group, it's really not very difficult to make evidence that some act that was committed by a government or by an organization has caused serious mental harm to members of a group. But the difficult part is with the…in demonstrating that was done with the intent to destroy the group physically. And people say this is very hard to prove. And of course, it's true, it's extremely difficult to prove, because you can make the evidence of an intent to do something when you have a crime that requires evidence of an intent. We call that specific or special intent in criminal law, you need to…you can do it in two ways. One of them is to prove it with direct evidence. So if somebody…if a country says we are going to destroy that group, then you have direct evidence, as they've admitted what they intend to do. But very often, governments and criminals, individual criminals don't demonstrate what their intent is. Sometimes individual criminals say what they intend to do. They do it now on social media. But in the absence of that evidence, and in most of the recent cases where allegations of genocide have been made, there's no direct evidence of a government or of a group saying we intend to destroy that group. And so then the way you prove the intent is by inference by deduction, by looking at patterns of conduct, patterns of behaviour, that lead to the conclusion that this is what they intend to do. And that's a very accepted technique in criminal law when we have to prove criminal intent. We often have to prove it based on inferences drawn from the conduct of groups or people based on the fact that people intend the consequences of their acts. That's just an empirical observation. But here's the problem. When you're dealing with a crime that requires this special intent, or this specific intent, you cannot convict somebody of the crime unless you can prove that intent beyond a reasonable doubt. And that means that if there's an alternative explanation for the conduct of the group, for the act, an alternative explanation, as opposed to the intent to physically destroy the group, then you have to acquit, then you have to conclude that you don't have the proof of genocide. And I hear this over and over again, people say it's probable that they intended to destroy the group. And my answer is, that's not good enough. You have to be certain, it has to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

当然，灭绝种族罪像其他所有法律文本一样，通常有着很大的解释空间。人们对《公约》中灭绝种族罪的定义有各种各样的解释。平心而论，我认为有很多人，包括一些活动家，一些学者，他们对灭绝种族有自己的定义，他们对《公约》中灭绝种族的定义不满意。他们采用,他们推进和使用这个词的其他定义，但很明显，他们也经常承认这些定义不包括法律定义。所以我要说的是…我不会去解决这个问题，那超出了国际法的范围。在国际法中，我们处理的是定义，基本上是1948年《灭绝种族罪公约》第2条。这一定义被一遍又一遍地重复，证实了这是灭绝种族罪的既定国际法定义。因此，我们在《国际刑事法院罗马规约》第六条、前南斯拉夫问题国际刑事法庭规约和卢旺达问题国际刑事法庭规约中找到了同样的定义。现在，这个定义谈到了消灭，但没有谈到物理上消灭。尽管如此，根据主要国际法庭的解释，物理消灭是必要的要求。就适用的国际法而言，我认为这是毫无疑问的。我最近参加了一个网上研讨会，会上有另一位国际律师说:是否需要物理上消灭还有待商榷。但我认为这是完全错误的。我不认为，我的意思是，你可以说任何事情都是可以被讨论的，但是当主要的国际法庭的判决在这一点上的观点基本一致时，人们便不能声称这是一个仍有探讨空间的问题。这样的声称简直是无知的。所以物质要件是有两部分的。有一个灭绝种族实质行为的清单，从杀害团体成员开始，到对团体成员造成严重的身体或精神伤害，再到防止生育等等。一般来说，这些灭绝种族的实质行为并不难证明。在所有关于灭绝种族的指控中，声称发生了这五种行为之一是有一定依据的。当有第二种行为，即对群体成员造成精神伤害时，要证明政府或组织实施的某些行为对团体成员造成了严重的精神伤害，真的不是很难。而困难的部分在于证明这是为了从实质上消灭这个团体。人们都说这很难证明。当然，这是真的，很难证明，因为当你被指控的罪行需要证据对意图进行证明时，证据便可以证明你有做某事的意图。我们在刑法中称之为特定或特别意图，你可以通过两种方式来实现，其中之一就是用直接证据证明。因此，如果一个国家说要消灭某个团体，那么你便有了直接的证据，因为他们已经承认了他们打算做什么。但是很多时候，政府和罪犯、罪犯个人都没有表明他们的意图是什么。有时个别罪犯会说出他们打算做什么。如今他们会在社交媒体上说。但是在缺乏证据的情况下，在最近大多数指控灭绝种族的案件中，没有直接的证据表明政府或某个组织说我们打算消灭某个团体。因此，你证明意图的方式是通过推论，通过观察行为模式，从而得出结论，这就是他们想要做的。当我们需要去证明犯罪意图时，这便是一个在刑法中被广为接受的技巧。我们常常不得不根据从群体或个人的行为中得出的推论来证明这一点，这些推论是基于人们有意为其行为的后果这一事实。这只是一个经验性的观察。但问题是。当你在处理需要这种特殊意图或这种特定意图的犯罪时，除非你能证明这种意图已经排除了合理怀疑，否则你不能判定有罪。也就是说，如果对团体的行为有另一种解释，而非实质上消灭团体的意图，那么你必须宣判无罪，你必须得出你没有灭绝种族的证据的结论。我经常听到这么一种说法，说他们很可能打算消灭这个团体。我的回答是，这还不够。你必须确定，它必须是确凿无疑的证据。

Andy TIAN: Thank you, professor. Let's turn to the real case scenario and talk about Xinjiang once again. In addition to the policy statements from the United States, also there are some reports and papers from NGOs, such as Newlines Institute, Australia Strategic and Policy Institute and individual papers which was written by Adrian Zenz from Germany. So, regarding whether there were crimes of genocide in Xinjiang and taking those NGO reports as a reference, what are the main points of disagreements on this issue? Could you please highlight them once again? Some of them you have touched upon.

感谢教授。让我们把话题转向实际案例场景当中，再讨论一下新疆，其中除了美国的政策声明以外，还包括非政府组织如Newlines Institute、澳大利亚战略政策研究所等，以及德国的学者郑国恩所撰写的个人文章。关于他们的在新疆灭绝种族问题上的研究，以那些非政府组织的报告为参考，在这个问题上倒地有哪些主要分歧呢？能否请你再次强调一下？有些你刚才已经谈到。

William Schabas: Yes, well, of course, I've read, I don't know that I've read all of the reports. But I've read many of the different reports on the subject. Some of them are more serious than others. You refer to the work of Zenz on the question of births, and he has done various statistical analyses. And I've looked at those and I'm not a statistician, but they don't lead to too convincing evidence of an intent to destroy the group. There's a tendency, I think, to misrepresent the evidence that he has in some of the other reports. As I understand it, his evidence, and again, I'm not saying that the evidence that I necessarily believe all the evidence, but I have to take it, we have to assume that the evidence is can be supported, but the evidence he produces is of attempts in China to reduce the birth rate of Uyghurs so that it is a birth rate that is comparable to that of others in China, and not to prevent births altogether, but to reduce a birth rate that is greatly higher than the existing birth rate, on the average for people in the People's Republic of China. To me, this is not strong evidence of an intent to destroy the group. And it has many other explanations. We know that China for the last 40 years has had various policies directed at limiting the number of births in the country. And we have to understand measures like that, within that context, the most serious legal analysis, and that's really the part that I deal with. Because I'm an international lawyer. I'm not a demographer. I'm not a social scientist. When I read the report, there's a report by some barristers in London that has been widely circulated, and has been presented by Uyghur activists as establishing a good case for genocide. I don't think it establishes a good case at all. I read that report very carefully, and there's a point there's a sentence in the middle of the report where they say that they do not have evidence or good evidence of the intent to physically destroy the group. They have lots of other evidence they say that support allegations of genocide, they just don't have the crucial one. It's like saying that you're going…you have evidence that somebody committed a murder, but you just don't have any evidence or enough serious evidence they intended to kill the person, well, then you don't have a crime. So I find that that report, it's very carefully worded, many of these reports are misleading in the formulation. So the report by the barristers looks like a lengthy analysis concluding that the genocide is taking place in China. And it's been quoted that way by NGOs, I think it's been quoted that way by parliamentarians in Britain, as support for the allegations of China against China, except that it's flawed. It has a very serious flaw. That's right inside the report where the authors of the report acknowledge…they admit that they don't have serious evidence of the intent to physically destroy the group. And if they don't have that, they can't say there's genocide, they just can't ask for the report by Newlines, which I've also read the Newlines’ report is premise…is supported on an incorrect interpretation of the Genocide Convention. And as I mentioned a few minutes ago, there are others and this is in the Newlines’ report, they essentially dismiss the approach taken to the definition of genocide by the International Court of Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. So this is the work of some international lawyers, some lawyers who wrote the report, who don't agree with the law. And but they don't say that explicitly. It's not clear what they should say at the beginning, is put product warning, this brochure, this booklet, this report on genocide is based on a disagreement with the mainstream interpretation of the crime of genocide by the major international courts. So you know, I've given those examples. The State Department report, the United States Department of State report is absolutely worthless, because they use the term genocide, but they don't give any justification for it. They give no legal analysis. They list a whole lot of facts, factual allegations against China. But it's impossible to determine which of those allegations is there to support a charge of genocide, and which is there to support other claims. So they have, they have information about elections in China, they have information about free speech in China. These are obviously irrelevant to the issue of genocide, but it's impossible to determine. So the Department of State report is absolutely worthless. The Newlines’ report is in serious disagreement, profound disagreement with the mainstream of international legal tribunals today. And the report of the British barristers says that they don't have evidence of the intent to destroy the group. So none of these makes a reasonable case for genocide.

好的。当然，我不知道我是否读过所有的关于这个主题的报告，但是我读过其中的大部分。其中一些比其他的更严肃。你提到了郑国恩在生育问题上做的工作，他做了各种统计分析。我看过这些，虽然我不是统计学家，但它们并不能提供太有说服力的证据来证明摧毁维吾尔这个团体的意图。我认为，歪曲他在其他一些报告中所掌握的证据乃是一种趋势。据我所知，他的证据，我并不是说我必须相信所有的证据，但我必须接受它，我们必须假设证据是可以支持的。但他提供的证据是中国试图降低维吾尔族的出生率，使其出生率与中国其他人的出生率相当，这并不是完全防止生育， 而是要降低一个对于中国人民来说要远高于现有出生率的平均出生率。对我来说，这并不是想要消灭这个团体的有力证据。这还有很多其他的解释。我们知道，过去40年以来，中国一直都有各种旨在限制国内出生人数的政策。我们必须理解这样的措施，在这种背景下，最严肃的法律分析，才是我真正要处理的部分。因为我是国际律师，而不是人口学家，不是社会科学家。当我阅读这份报告时，伦敦一些大律师制作的一份报告已经广为流传，维吾尔族活动人士称这份报告为灭绝种族提供了一个很好的案例。我认为这根本不是一个好的案例。我非常仔细地阅读了那份报告，有一点，在报告的中间有一句话，他们说他们没有证据或合适的证据表明他们有实质消灭该团体的意图。他们有很多其他证据支持灭绝种族的指控，但是他们没有关键的证据。这就像是你声称你有证据证明某些人犯了谋杀罪，但你没有任何证据或足够严肃的证据证明他们打算杀死这个人，那么，他们便没有犯罪。我发现那份报告，措辞非常谨慎，许多报告在表述上有误导性。因此，大律师的报告看起来像是一份冗长的分析报告，结论是灭绝种族正在中国发生。非政府组织也是这样引用的，我想英国议员也是这样引用的，以作为对中国指控的依据支持，只不过它是有缺陷的。它有一个非常严重的缺陷，那就是在报告当中，报告的作者承认，他们没有确凿的证据表明被指控者有从实质上消灭维吾尔族团体的意图。如果他们没有这些证据，那么他们就不能说存在灭绝种族。我也读过Newlines Institute的报告, 它是基于对灭绝种族公约的错误解释而做出的。正如我几分钟前提到的，在Newlines Institute的报告中，当然还有其他人，他们基本上不接受国际法院、前南斯拉夫问题国际刑事法庭和卢旺达问题国际刑事法庭对灭绝种族罪做定义所采取的标准。这就是一些国际律师的工作，写这份报告的律师，他们不同意现行法律，但是他们没有明确地说出来。他们并不清楚什么是需要在一开始就要说清楚的，比如开头放一个警告性声明：这个手册或者说这份关于灭绝种族的报告，是基于对主要国际法院对灭绝种族罪主流解释的异议之上的。如你所见，我已经举了这些例子。美国国务院的报告是绝对没有价值的，因为他们用了灭绝种族这个词，但没有给出任何理由。他们没有给出法律分析。他们列出了一大堆针对中国的事实和指控，但是不可能确定这些指控中的哪一个是支持灭绝种族的指控，哪一个支持其他指控。其中有关于中国选举的，有关于中国言论自由的。这些显然与灭绝种族问题无关，都无法对灭绝种族罪进行定罪，所以美国国务院的报告绝对一文不值。Newlines Institute的报告与当今国际法庭的对灭绝种族罪的主流解释存在严重分歧。英国大律师协会的报告称，他们没有证据表明存在消灭维吾尔族团体的意图。所以这些都不能成为认定灭绝种族的合理理由。

Andy TIAN: I hope that audiences could get a deeper understanding after your explanation. But still you invite me to ask you another question, since you are also practitioners, for those individual peoples and NGO reports like the Newlines and Adrian Zenz, are these reports more credible than the government reports, and could they be admitted in the ICC or any international criminal tribunals? We would like to have your comments.

我希望观众在听到你的解释后能对此有更深刻的理解。不过你让我想起了另一个问题，因为你也是执业律师，对于某些个人和非政府组织的报告，比如Newlines Institute和郑国恩，这些报告是否比政府报告更可信？它们能否被国际刑事法院或任何其他国际法庭所接受？我们想听听你的意见。

William Schabas: Well, the general rule before international courts and tribunals is that you have to… the evidence has to be reliable, has to come from reliable sources. But international courts and tribunals are fairly flexible in the evidence that is produced before them. So before the International criminal tribunals, the judges will, we say, admit the evidence. It doesn't mean that they will believe it. But they will consider it, they won't refuse to read these reports, or to see these reports. The defense lawyers in a criminal prosecution of an individual are, of course, going to challenge these reports in the reliability, particularly because the reports themselves don't indicate their sources. So it's a very…they're very unreliable in terms of evidence that could be used in court. Sometimes you will have a reliable report issued by a UN body, for example, everything depends on the circumstances. The other thing is that these reports are in general, not written by neutral actors, but they're written at the request of one side trying to make an argument. And so they're not expert opinions, a proper expert opinion comes from somebody who weighs both sides, and who is not there to try and argue a case for one side or the other. At the interna…so in the international criminal tribunals, they will…they won't reject these reports, they will find their way to the file. But it would be very, very unusual for judges to base a conviction of somebody on evidence that is only supported by one of these reports. The other thing is the reports, as I mentioned, are also full of opinions. So judges aren't really interested in other people's opinions. Judges make their own opinions. But sometimes the reports…some sometimes a report can be useful as a source of factual information. But I don't think these reports do that. And they tend to be very circular because they quote each other. So one report quotes another report. And it looks like there's a bigger volume of evidence than there really is. I don't think that the Uyghur case could easily find its way before either an International Criminal Court or before the International Court of Justice. China has not accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. So I don't see practically how that case could come before the International Court of Justice. As for the International Criminal Court, I know that some lawyers, some barristers are trying to prepare charges against China, in the hope that the prosecutor will try to prosecute them. But they are based on…not on the charge of genocide. They're based on allegations of deportation. And that's a separate question. It would take another podcast to go into the debate about all of that. But I don't see that charges of genocide, dealing with the Uyghur situation can easily find their way to the either the International Criminal Court or to the International Court of Justice.

国际法院和法庭的一般规则是证据必须可靠，必须来自可靠的来源。但是国际法院和法庭对于在他们面前所出示的证据的态度相当灵活。因此，我们说，在国际刑事法庭上，法官会允许呈现这些证据。但这并不意味着他们会相信。他们有自己的考量，他们不会拒绝去读或者去看这些报告。在针对一个个体的刑事诉讼中，辩护律师当然会质疑这些报告的可靠性，尤其是因为这些报告本身并没有指出它们的来源。所以它们是可以在法庭上使用但却非常不可靠的证据。根据情况，有时你会持有一份可靠的报告，例如由联合国机构发布的报告。另一件事是这些报告通常并非由中立角色所写的，而是在试图进行争论的其中一方的要求之下所写的。因此它们并非专家意见，并非一个来自于懂得权衡双方、不会试图去为一方或另一方辩护的人所写的恰当的专家意见。在国际刑事法庭，法官不会拒绝这些报告，他们自有办法对这些文件进行判断。但是，对于法官来说，将某人的定罪建立在只有其中一份报告作为支撑的证据上，是非常非常不寻常的。正如我刚提到的，另一件事是报告也充满了观点。法官对别人的意见并不感兴趣。法官会发表自己的意见。但是有时候将报告作为事实信息的来源仍是有用的。但我不认为这些报告会在这方面发挥作用。这些报告都非常间接，因为它们之间在互相引用。一份报告引用了另一份报告。这让其看起来证据比实际的多。我不认为维吾尔族的情况会很轻易地在国际刑事法院或国际法院上得到解决。中国不接受国际法院的管辖。因此，我不认为该案件会提交国际法院审理。至于国际刑事法院，我知道一些律师、大律师正在试图准备对中国的指控，并希望检察官尝试去起诉中国。但是他们的指控不是基于灭绝种族的行为。这些指控是基于驱逐出境的行为。这是另一个问题了，这需要另一个播客来对这些进行讨论。但我不认为对维吾尔族情况所提起的灭绝种族指控可以轻易进入国际刑事法院或国际法院的考虑范围。

Andy TIAN: Thank you Professor. There are also some human rights violations or even atrocities in some other countries. Western countries, let me be frank, for instance, the United States has a problem of black lives matters; in Canada, there are unmarked graves; and also the Australian soldiers’ war crimes in Afghanistan. So could there be any kind of forms of accountability for those alleged crimes or atrocities by western countries? If not, why?

感谢教授。除了刚所提及的，在其他一些国家也有一些对人权的侵犯甚至暴行。我坦白地说，在西方国家，例如美国有“黑命贵”问题；在加拿大有少数族裔无名坟墓，还有澳大利亚士兵在阿富汗犯下的战争罪。那么，对于西方国家犯下的所有这些罪行或暴行，是否会有任何形式的责任追究？如果没有，请问为何？

William Schabas: Well, you know, the United Nations, from the very beginning, has been an institution that was based on the one hand on the equality of states from…of all countries, bearing in mind that five countries have a very special position as permanent members of the Security Council, but it's not a regional body. It's not a body that's premised on one part of the world dominating another part of the world, in theory. But of course, when the United Nations was created in practice, some of the European countries had colonial empires, they only gave them up 15 years or more later. And the United Nations has a history in dealing with human rights have double standards. For example, the United Nations was very initially had difficulty in dealing with racial discrimination, partly because the United Nations was headquartered in the United States, and the United States had a big influence on the United Nations. And the United States had, and still has a very serious problem with racial discrimination. So the focus on racial discrimination went in the United Nations only came later, when the Charter of the United Nations was being drafted in 1944. At the very very beginning, a Chinese diplomat proposed that an idea that had originated in Japan in 1919, to have a declaration on racial discrimination in the Charter of the United Nations, was dismissed by the United States and the United Kingdom. And it was only when African countries joined the United Nations in large numbers, that racial discrimination became an important issue. So I'm giving that as an example. It's an institution that, on the one hand, is universal in scope. But it's, on the other hand, an institution that is influenced by the politics of the time by the membership of the organization, and that continues to this day. So, in the west, people will say that the China escapes criticism at certainly in bodies, like the Security Council, because it has the veto. The same can be said of the United States and of some other countries, it protects like, like Israel. There are mechanisms in the United Nations that have been accepted by some countries, very few of them by the United States, and very few of them by China. And it's voluntary. So those countries have to accept those mechanisms in order to be subject to a certain level of mechanisms of control of human rights or monitoring of human rights. Only a few weeks ago, the American Secretary of State Blinken said that the United States would welcome what are called the Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations to come and investigate racial discrimination in the United States. He is now being attacked brutally in the right-wing media in the United States for doing this. So there are opportunities to address human rights violations by various governments, big and small, members of the United Nations. Some of them escaped because they're not in the United Nations like Taiwan, for example. Taiwan is one of the hardest because Taiwan was not a member of the United Nations. And until we have some resolution of the situation, that's going to remain. I don't want to get into that issue, just to say that there are some black holes in terms of dealing with human rights within the United Nations. There are some countries that accept the mechanisms with considerable enthusiasm, and others that don't. You mentioned Canada, which is a country I know. Well, I come from Canada. And I'm painfully aware of the evidence of the abuse of indigenous peoples in Canada, historically. But also at the present day, and Canada is more exposed to these mechanisms. Canada is going to be severely criticized internationally, but it varies from one country to another. And that depends on the issues as well.

你知道，从一开始，联合国一方面以所有国家之间的平等为基础，但同时还需铭记它有着五个作为安理会常任理事国而具有非常特殊的地位的国家。它并非一个区域性机构。理论上来说，它不是一个以世界的其中一部分支配着世界的另一部分为前提而建立的机构。当然，在实践中，当联合国成立时，一些欧洲国家是殖民帝国，只不过他们在之后的15年或更长时间后才放弃这些殖民地。而且联合国在处理人权问题上有双重标准的历史。例如，联合国刚开始的时候，很难处理种族歧视问题，其中一部分原因是联合国总部设在美国，美国对联合国有很大的影响力。美国在过去乃至现在仍然有非常严重的种族歧视问题。所以联合国对种族歧视的关注出现的比较晚，是在1944年起草《联合国宪章》的时候。一开始，一位中国外交官提出了一个源自于1919年的日本的想法，即在《联合国宪章》中写入有关种族歧视的宣言，但被美国和英国驳回。只有当大量的非洲国家加入联合国时，种族歧视才成为一个重要问题，因此我才举这个例子。一方面，这是一个全球性机构，但另一方面，它是一个受当时政治因素和组织成员影响的机构，这种影响一直持续到今天。因此，在西方，人们会说，因为中国拥有一票否决权，所以它在安理会等机构中肯定避开了不少的批评。然而美国和其他一些国家也是如此，保护着像以色列这样的国家。联合国有着一些被各国家所接受的机制，而美国接受的很少，中国接受的也很少。这是自愿的。因此，这些国家必须接受这些机制，以便服从于某种程度的人权控制或人权监督。就在几周前，美国国务卿布林肯表示，美国将欢迎所谓的联合国特别报告员前来调查美国的种族歧视问题。他如今正因为这样做而受到美国右翼媒体的猛烈抨击。因此，无论大小，联合国各成员国的人权侵犯问题都将有机会得到解决。它们当中有一些被遗忘掉了，因为他们不是联合国的成员，比如台湾。台湾是最难的问题之一，因为台湾不是联合国的成员。在解决台湾问题之前，这种情况会一直存在。我不想讨论这个问题，我只想说，在联合国内部处理人权问题这方面存在一些黑洞。有些国家相当热情地接受这些机制，有些国家则不接受。你刚提到了加拿大，这是我非常熟悉的一个国家。对，我来自加拿大。当知道到历史上加拿大土著人民遭受虐待的证据时我感到很痛苦。但如今的加拿大将会更多地暴露在联合国的这些机制之下。加拿大将会在国际上受到严厉的批评，但是每个国家都不一样，同时这也取决于具体问题。

Andy TIAN: Thank you. Last question. Let's turn to…you have mentioned some updates on the Xinjiang issue in 2021. Rodney Dixon and his team have submitted new evidence to the International Criminal Court to try to persuade prosecutors to open an investigation into alleged forced deportations of Uyghur Muslim into China from Tajikistan. As a legal basis…they are taking the legal basis as “the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar case”, these lawyer think that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over crime when part of the criminal conduct takes place on the territory of a State Party. In this case, Tajikistan is a State Party to the Rome Statute. So could they follow the same logic of Rohingya case? What do you expect the impact of these new submissions from Dixon? Thank you.

谢谢你。最后一个问题。你提到了2021年新疆问题的一些新情况。罗德尼·迪克森(Rodney Dixon)和他的团队向国际刑事法院提交了新的证据，试图说服检察官对维族穆斯林从塔吉克斯坦被强行驱逐到中国的指控展开调查。他们以孟加拉国与缅甸案的情况作为法律依据，这位律师认为，当部分犯罪、部分行为发生在缔约国境内时，国际刑事法院可以行使管辖权。在这种情况下，塔吉克斯坦是《罗马规约》的缔约国。那么他们能否采取与罗兴亚案同样逻辑？你认为迪克森新提交的证据会有什么影响？谢谢你。

William Schabas: Yes, I haven't seen the submissions. So I don't know what new evidence they had. My understanding was that the first stage that they need to overcome, the first stage they need to do in getting a case before the International Criminal Court is to convince the prosecutor to proceed. And last December, the prosecutor said that she was not going to proceed. I don't think it was about the sufficiency of the evidence. So much as the fact that the alleged expulsions or deportations from Tajikistan into China weren't really covered. They weren't the same as the Bangladesh/Myanmar situation because the Bangladesh/Myanmar situation involve people being driven out of a country that wasn't a member of the court, Myanmar, into a country that was. And they said, well, that's the crime of deportation because you're driving people out of their homes. They said this was not the same with deportations from Tajikistan into China. Because people weren't being driven out of their homes. They said that was the thinking of the prosecutor and the prosecutor has very great discretion in this area. So I wouldn't think that new evidence about deportations from Tajikistan into China is going to assist Rodney Dixon and his team and the case they're trying to make. I understood from Rodney Dixon that what he's planning to do is to try and develop a case that there have been deportations or expulsions from China to other countries, and to try and demonstrate that that's a situation similar to what went on in Myanmar/Bangladesh. And there, the situation would be much more similar to the Myanmar/Bangladesh situation which has been approved that theory about the case has been approved by the prosecutor and by some of the judges. It's not been challenged properly. It was presented by the prosecutor to the judges and the judges agreed, but it's not been contested by defense lawyers. I think that it's a very controversial notion. But I can't predict the outcome. I just think that that what has happened so far, is that the judges have accepted the reasoning of the prosecutor. But that's partly because the prosecutors reasoning hasn't been attacked by lawyers arguing for the other side, I think there are some good arguments that the approach they've taken in Myanmar/Bangladesh is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. And if that's the case, the attempts to address the situation with the Uyghur in China will also fail. And as I mentioned before, remember, this is not a genocide allegation. This is an allegation of the crime against humanity of deportation. There's no way in which the Myanmar, Bangladesh approach to jurisdiction can work with the crime of genocide. Nobody suggested that. So that wouldn't work, either for Myanmar or for the People's Republic of China.

我还没看到它所提交的文件，所以我不知道他们有什么新证据。我的理解是，他们在第一个阶段需要克服的，即在将案件提交至国际刑事法院的这一阶段，他们需要做的是说服检察官继续推进调查。而检察官在12月的时候说她不打算继续了。我认为这与证据的充分性无关。甚至所谓的从塔吉克斯坦驱逐到中国的事实都没有真正地被报道过。它们与孟加拉国与缅甸的情况不同，因为孟加拉国与缅甸的情况涉及到人们从缅甸这个非国际刑事法院成员国当中被赶出来，进入到一个国际刑事法院的成员国。因为你把人们赶出了他们的家，所以他们说这是驱逐出境的罪行。他们说，这与从塔吉克斯坦驱逐到中国不一样，因为人们没有被赶出家门。他们说这是检察官的想法，检察官在这方面有很大的自由裁量权。因此，我不认为关于从塔吉克斯坦驱逐到中国的新证据会有助于罗德尼·迪克森和他的团队以及他们试图证明的案件。我对罗德尼·迪克森的理解是，他计划去尝试和发展一个从中国被驱逐到其他国家的案例，并尝试证明这种情况类似于缅甸和孟加拉国的情况。关于缅甸和孟加拉国这两个国家的案件的理论，已经得到了检察官和一些法官的同意，且没有受到适当的反对。它是由检察官提交给法官的，法官同意了，但辩护律师没有对此提出异议。我认为这是一个非常有争议的概念。但我无法预测结果。我只是认为，到目前为止发生的事是，法官接受了检察官的推理。但这部分是因为检察官的推理没有受到来自另一方的律师的攻击，我认为有一些很好的论据可以表明，他们在缅甸和孟加拉国案当中采取的方法并非对罗马规约的合理解释。如果是这样的话，那迪克森在试图解决中国维吾尔族问题上的努力也将失败。正如我之前提到的，记住，这不是灭绝种族的指控，这是对驱逐出境这一危害人类罪的指控。缅甸与孟加拉国案中获得管辖权的方法不可能适用于灭绝种族罪。没人会这么建议。因此，无论是对缅甸还是对中国，这都行不通。

Andy TIAN: Thank you professor for your insightful and informative analysis on the crime of genocide, we look forward to the publishing of your book in Chinese and as well to welcome you and other experts to pay a visit to Xinjiang whenever the pandemic allows. Thank you, professor!

感谢教授对灭绝种族罪的深刻和翔实的分析。我们期待着您的书籍以中文出版，也欢迎您和其他的专家在新冠大流行防疫政策允许的情况下访问新疆。谢谢你，教授！

William Schabas: Thank you!

非常感谢！

Andy TIAN: Thank you for time, thank you, bye.

谢谢您的时间，谢谢，再见。

Andy TIAN: That’s Professor William Schabas. Thanks for listening and we hope you enjoy our program. Please do follow us and subscribe the Global Governance Perspective. You could also follow us on our Twitter and Facebook to write your comments. Look forward to your joining us next time.

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（音频地址：https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/WoHal5HJmFrZ7EsNepClPQ）